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Abstract
In this paper we seek to develop a ‘relational’ perspective on accountability and on
so-called ‘unaccountability.’. We focus on Mark Bovens’s use of the forum metaphor in
his accountability model, arguing that his relational perspective is too narrow. We advo-
cate instead a far broader and more fundamental engagement with the idea of relational
accountability. Expanding the metaphors, we point to two other accountability spaces:
‘agora,’ a primordial accountability space and ‘bazaar,’ an emergent accountability space
rooted in ground-level exchange between dierent actors. Assertions about ‘unaccount-
ability,’ we argue, very often reect a failure to appreciate the fundamentally relational
nature of accountability: those who use such assertions as bases for action aimed at mak-
ing situations, processes or people ‘more accountable’ in fact seek to assert or impose a
certain form of relationship – one that is hierarchical and monopolistic – and reect there-
fore a drive to power and domination.
1 Introduction
For many decades the scholarly analysis and elaboration of accountability focused on its
role as a general term applied to particular means and mechanisms for maintaining po-
litical, legal and administrative oversight and control. Since the mid-1980s, however, the
study of accountability has been transformed as the term emerged as a ‘cultural keyword’
reecting its extension into the political rhetoric and everyday language of our time (Dub-
nick 2014a). In its cultural form, the concept has become both iconic and holographic.
For example, its mere use in the title of legislation triggers an aective response whether
or not the term’s use is appropriate or justied by the content of the law. The symbolic
gesture of stating ‘we shall hold them accountable’ is now part of the standard repertoire
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of public ocials responding to some scandalous faux pas or criminal act. Moreover, we
now associate the notion of accountability to any ‘good governance’ reform agenda that
promises to reduce corruption, enhance performance, assure justice and improve demo-
cratic involvement. The concept of accountability, in short, has become both the medium
and the message of modern governance. Today, the study of governance is eectively the
study of accountability.i
This paper seeks to develop one mode of thinking on accountability – the ‘relational’
mode. We distinguish this perspective, associated primarily with the work of Mark Bovens
and other contributors to the ‘Bovens model,’ from other ways of approaching the problem
of what accountability actually is. The rst half of this paper is devoted to a discussion of
the Bovens model, how it uses the forum metaphor and how it negotiates a line between
more traditional and mechanistic ‘principal-agent’ perspectives and an outlook that fo-
cuses on particular social relations in the development of accountability.
The paper’s second half seeks to expand upon the Bovens model by outlining two re-
lational accountability spaces: ‘agora,’ which we regard as a ‘primordial’ accountability
space upon which other spaces rely, and ‘bazaar,’ where accountability relationships based
on mutual exchange emerge.
Our aim, at least in the rst instance, is to isolate the principal-agent components of the
relational model and to demonstrate how critical the ‘relational’ is to accountability in the
rst place. We do not do this in order to abstract out the components of accountablity for it
own sake. We do it because we seek to explain so-called unaccountability: deviations from
principal demands (drifting though they are, on which see Schillemans and Busuioc 2014))
tend to be conceptualised as simple misfeasance, or corruption, or ‘shirking,’ the solution
to which invariably involve harsher penalties or more tempting inducements (depending,
a cynic might suggest, on how high up the ‘unaccountable’ actor sits in the hierarchy).
We urge, rather, that apparent unaccountability be approached and conceptualised as a
function of other forms of accountability, though perhaps ones that are subterranean and
are illegible to the forum. These forms of accountability represent the human drive to
negotiate the multiple, diverse and often conicting expectations (Dubnick 2014b) that
arise in all aspects of their social lives, including their worlds of work.
We dier from the Bovens model in the degree to whcih we emphasise organisations,
whether administrative or corporate, as a social ux, unpredictable, unstable, and often
unmanageable. Modernity is in large part the story of the organisational tools employed
to solidify, constrain and direct that social ux, but we ought not to pretend either that
modernity’s project has been a resounding success on this front or that we would wish its
success to be complete.
Accountability’s role in the policy realm and in theory both invites frustration in its
ongoing failure to achieve submission and acts as ‘promise,’ (Dubnick and Frederickson
2011a) holding out the hope that the right measures or the right attitudes or the right in-
terventions will lead us to better performance, or coordination or the like. Accountability
so conceived aims towards a kind of silence, where aims, intends and actions are trans-
parent and clear. Accountablity as we conceive it is never so: it is noisy, complicated and
multifaceted. The Bovens’s model hints that this sense of accountability is what dieren-
tiates it from the principal-agent perspective. Our point is that the model does not go far
enough. The forum metaphor, we fear, acts to constrain thinking about accountability and
allows people to drive themselves back towards the very principal-agent thinking that the
forum metaphor could have surpassed. The focus on process and hierarchy restricts the
forum’s potential to broaden our thought: a point we discuss in the section below.
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2 The Forum and Accountable Governance
Ironically, while the relevance and salience of (and academic interest in) accountable gov-
ernance has expanded, accountability has become more elusive both conceptually and
theoretically. Often regarded in the past as a species of ‘responsibility,’ii accountability is
now frequently treated as the primary concept (i.e., the genus) among those terms bear-
ing a synonymic ‘family resemblance’ to responsibility.iii Thus, rather than being regarded
as a distinct alternative to other members of that conceptual family, accountability is in-
creasingly perceived as an encompassing concept that covers what has traditionally been
associated with responsibility, and then some. In everyday usage as well as in scholarship,
few would argue with the idea that to be accountable is to be liable, obliged, responsive,
transparent, answerable, blameworthy, trustworthy, etc. Accountability as a cultural phe-
nomenon has enveloped and contained most of its familial relations.
This ‘ever expansive’ nature of the concept (Mulgan 2000) is clearly a challenge to those
who seek conceptual clarity, and especially to those attempting to make theoretical sense
of how the cultural form of accountability impacts on governance. In this section we
explore and seek to build on the major eort undertaken by Bovens and others to deal with
that challenge – the development of a forum-based model of accountability. The work of
Bovens and his colleagues represents one pathway among several that have attempted to
address the need for fresh approach to the study of accountability now that it has assumed
keyword status and become untethered from responsibility.
2.1 One Model Among Many
Putting the Bovens model in perspective, it must be seen in the light of the broader metathe-
oretical challenge to make sense of accountability (see Table 1 below).iv Various theories
and frameworks have been mobilized and applied to that task. Some deal with accountabil-
ity through principal-agent models that stress a mechanistic view of accountability – that
is, that accountability involves various arrangements aimed at dealing with the problem-
atics of getting agents to comply to with the preferences of their principals (see Gailmard
2014; Mansbridge 2014). Others treat accountability as a function of governance, and rely
on institutionalist theories and models to explain their emergence and development over
time (e.g, Harlow 2014; Olsen 2014). Still another perspective views accountability as a
form of behavior that can be explained using theoretical lenses borrowed from social psy-
chology and cultural studies (see Hood 2014; Patil, Vieider, and Tetlock 2014).
The relational view of accountability, nally, focuses attention on accountability’s emer-
gent and ‘second-personal’ nature. As we will argue, much of the theoretical work under-
lying this view is associated with moral theory and specically the work of contemporary
writers such as Steven Darwall (2006; 2013) and othersv who have revived interest in the
ethical foundations of accountable relationships.
Because it is rooted in the relational perspective, the Bovens model oers some insight
into this understanding of accountability; but as we will see its reliance on the forum
metaphor does not provide a theoretical foundation for pursuing the study of accountabil-
ity. Our task here is to lay the groundwork for such a theory by using other metaphorical
models to demonstrate the relevance and power of the second-personal standpoint for our
understanding of relational accountability.
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Accountability as: Relevant theory:
Mechanism Principal-Agent Theories
Function Institutionalist
Behavior Social psychology; cultural
Relationships Moral theory
Table 1: Four Models of Accountability
2.2 The Bovens Model
Central to the Bovens model is the concept of the ‘accountability forum’ that was rst used
by Mark Bovens in his 1998 The Quest for Responsibility:
Accounting for oneself, taking responsibility, and justifying oneself never. . .
happen in a vacuum; there is always something or someone who asks the
questions or makes the imputation. Such asking and accusing happens mostly
at the instigation and in the presence of some forum or other, varying in the
Constitution from the forum internum of the conscience to the informal forum
of family members, friends, and colleagues, the much more formal disciplinary
committee, tribunal, or parliamentary committee of inquiry, or even the tele-
vision, the forum of the nation. (Bovens 1998, 23-24; italics in original)
The concept is applied loosely and broadly throughout that work, with the forum indicat-
ing both some referenced ‘other’ and/or a type of venue. It is within the context of a forum
that responsibility is transformed into accountability.vi In that regard, the forum is more
than a mere ‘meeting space’ for interactions and exchanges (political, economic, social
and otherwise). In that sense, it is neither Habermasian public sphere nor Hayekian mar-
ketplace. The accountability forum functions, rather, as a juridical location where one is
subjected to the judgment of others through imputation and interrogation (Ricœur [1995]
2000; Van Hooft 2004).
The concept next emerges in 2005 in a number of sources, including a paper by Albert
Meijers and Bovens focused on accountability and information technologies (Meijer and
Bovens 2005), and again in a chapter Bovens contributes to a volume on public manage-
ment (Bovens 2005). These become the basis for a draft proposal for the funding of a major
research project which was to focus on accountable governance in Europe (Bovens, ’t Hart,
et al. 2005). There the Utrecht group (co-led by Meijers and Bovens) initially equates the
forum with the ‘accountee’ in an accountability relationship and uses the existence of a fo-
rum as the pivotal factor which distinguishes accountability from other forms of political
conduct or activities that involve, such as transparency, responsiveness and participation.
‘For an actor to be accountable, information is given to a forum, which then comes to a
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judgement that may have consequences for the actor in case it is negative’ (Meijer and
Bovens 2005, p. 5).vii In that sense, the forum becomes the dening feature of accountabil-
ity, and the projects to be undertaken in the research program would highlight the various
‘accountability modes’ and ‘accountability regimes’ reecting that forum-centered per-
spective.
What we regard as the Bovens model becomes clearer as the proposal focuses on their
intent to “open the black box of the accountability process” (emphasis in original).
The relationship between the actor and the forum, the account giving, usu-
ally consists of at least three elements or stages. First of all, the actor must
feel obliged to inform the forum about his conduct, by providing various sorts
of data about the performance of tasks, about outcomes, or about procedures.
Secondly, the information can prompt the forum to interrogate the actor and
to question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct
(debating phase). Thirdly, the forum usually passes judgement on the conduct
of the actor. In case of a negative judgement the forum may impose some sort
of sanctions on the accountor. These may be formal, such as nes, disciplinary
measures, or dismissal, but they can also be implicit or informal (such as neg-
ative publicity). The three projects will ascertain to what extent the various
accountability regimes entail each of these stages of an accountability process,
and will study the relevant processes to examine how they unfold, and what
pattern of relations between accountor and accountee exists (Bovens, ’t Hart,
et al. 2005, p. 6).
By 2007, Bovens was able to present the model as “a parsimonious analytical framework
that can help to establish more systematically whether organisation or ocials, exercising
public authority, are subject to accountability at all” (Bovens 2007, 448, emphasis in origi-
nal).viii Bovens emphasizes that the ‘framework’ is intentionally narrow and analytic in its
explicit focus on ‘account giving,’ which he denes as a relationship involving “the obliga-
tion to explain and justify conduct” to a forum. While acknowledging that the framework
does overlap with principal-agent models, he emphasizes that the actor-forum relation-
ship can be quite dierent (a point recently made explicit by two members of the Utrecht
project group (see Schillemans and Busuioc 2014), and he oers a seven-point summary
of what constitutes the ‘social relations’ at the heart of the model as well as a graphic
representation of the model’s relationships:
A relationship qualies as a case of accountability when:
1. there is a relationship between an actor and a forum
2. in which the actor is obliged
3. to explain and justify
4. his conduct;
5. the forum can pose questions;
6. pass judgement;
7. and the actor may face consequences.
Table 2: ‘Accountability as a Social Relations’ (box 1 in Bovens 2007, p. 452)
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Figure 1: ‘Accountability’ (gure 1 in Bovens 2007, p. 454)
The four-year research project based on the forum model generated a number of em-
pirical studies (e.g Brandsma 2013; Bovens, Curtin, and ’t Hart 2010), as well as further de-
velopment of the model itself. For example, two members of the Utrecht group – Thomas
Schillemans and Gijs Brandsma – recently published a more elaborate version (termed the
‘accountability cube’: see Figure 2 below) that attempts to enhance it usefulness as an an-
alytic tool by transforming the three dimensions of the original formulation (information,
discussion and consequences) into operational measures.
2.3 Assessing the Forum
As one of the only explicit attempts to develop a framework for analyzing accountability
relationships, the Bovens forum model might also be regarded as the basis for a theory of
such. However, while we think the model has proven its value as an analytic framework,
we are concerned that its analytic success can restrict the development of a credible theory
of relational accountability.
The basis for our argument is, in part, found in the developmental path of the model:
1. Accountability is conceptualized as a relationship, thus narrowing the model’s focus
and making alternative views (accountability as mechanism, function or behavior)
of secondary relevance.
2. The focus is further narrowed when the actor-forum interaction is established as
the core relationship. In the process, consideration of other forms of accountability
relationships are put aside.
3. Within the actor-forum relationship, three process factors are emphasized (e.g., in-
forming, discussing, judgment/sanctioning) to the minimization or exclusion of other,
often more substantive, situational factors (e.g., norms, values, rules, etc.).
To be clear, there is nothing inappropriate or wrong with that developmental path – and
in fact, the very process of modeling necessarily involves the selection and highlighting of
certain factors and the winnowing out of others. It is in the nature of model development
to narrow one’s perspective, which is why methodologists are quick to warn of the possible
drawbacks of overcommitment to any such construct (Kaplan 1964, Ch 7).
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Figure 2: ‘The Accountability Cube’ (gure 1 in Brandsma and Schillemans 2013)
Another source of concern for us involves the inherently metaphorical nature of the
forum model. Technically, the Bovens group regards the forum per se as just one factor
among several in their model (i.e., as synonymous with the ‘accountee’ in the relation-
ship). Nevertheless, their use of the forum factor is pivotal and critical to the model, and
few would argue against calling the construct the ‘forum model.’ But this labeling can
prove problematic, for the notion of a forum is tied into a range of dierent meanings and
contexts. Even within the Bovens group (as well as in Bovens’ initial use of the concept,
as quoted above), strict adherence to the idea of ‘forum = specic accountee’ is rare, and
they (like all of us) are easily drawn to the image of forum as a place or venue – a physical
or virtual space within which the action is taking place.
A major attraction of the ‘metaphorical style’ in model and theory construction is its
capacity to make dicult and abstract concepts and ideas come to life through more famil-
iar forms.ix Moreover, metaphors often act as an intellectual stimulant, allowing analysts
to extend their understanding of a subject further and deeper than was intended by de-
velopers of the initial model.x At the same time, the fertility and richness of metaphors
can prove counterproductive when they function as (pardon the metaphor) blinders or
constraints on theory development and analysis.
As we hinted at in the introduction above, it is our sense that the forum model/metaphor
is proving so inviting that it may be undermining the development of a more elaborate and
credible theory of relational accountability. Models, as valuable as they are to enhancing
our understanding of complex subject like accountability, are not theories. Oftentimes
they play key and critical roles in the process of theory development, but they can also act
distractions and diversions when they block consideration of alternative constructs that
might prove more fruitful.
In the case of the forum model and its success, we seem to be on the verge of overcom-
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mitment. The metaphor of the forum is a powerful one, and ts well with the conventional
view of accountability. Our sense is that the forum model, for all its insights and analytic
power, is lacking when it comes to theoretical credibility. It describes much, but at this
juncture explains little.
And yet, we are intrigued by the forum metaphor itself, for in establishing the idea that
accountability relationships occur within a certain context, the model has led us to con-
sider and contrast alternative metaphorical contexts within which account-giving takes
place.
2.4 The Relational
Our plan in the remainder of this paper is to broaden the relational perspective on account-
ability. Without at all suggesting that they represent an exhaustive overview of possible
accountability relationships,xi we do so by pointing towards two accountable relationships
that might emerge in public administration, where accountability emerges in particular
kinds of venue and towards specic others. These are the ‘agora’ and the ‘bazaar.’xii
While the forum’s overlap with principal-agent models in Bovens and others lies in its
focus on appraisal and action, it is possible to distinguish, as we see it, its relational un-
derpinning from its principal-agent derivation. Bovens’s emphasis on the investigatory
or confessional character of the forum ought not to diminish his perspective of it as rela-
tional. What this means, however, cannot simply be formulated with reference to process:
the relational is by necessity a negotiated space, both requiring social imagination on the
part of both account-holders and accountees.xiii
The forum’s juridical character is investigatory, relying in the rst instance upon a sym-
pathetic engagement between accountor and accountee.xiv This provides us with a crucial
distinction between the forum in the Bovens model and the principal-agent model, which
is led far more by power and contract.xv Whereas the forum must by denition begin with
the relationship, the principal-agent model brings the event that is under investigation to
the fore, linking it primarily to a principal’s (not necessarily unchanging, as Schillemans
and Busuioc (2014) point out) interpretation of contract and seeks to allocate consequences
on that basis. The forum, in other words, is interpretative, in the rst instance at least. The
principal-agent relationship is punitive. What Schillemans and Busuioc call ‘forum drift’
(Schillemans and Busuioc 2014, p. 11) is more likely a drift in principal intent with the
necessary discourse inherent in the forum as we describe it being weak or absent.
A distinction between the forum and the principal-agent perspective is important be-
cause it helps place the forum as a subset of and as reliant on the multiplicity of other
accountability spaces through which people live their lives and do their work. Bovens’s
use of the the forum metaphor – assisting him in taking an important step away from
mechanistic perspectives – still underplays the negotiated and the social in the relational
form.
The forum relies upon a pre-exiting sympathy between actors, whereas the principal-
agency model places a far greater emphasis on force or on the threat of force. That said the
forum as described in the Bovens model is narrowed by its focus both on the actor-forum
interaction and, within that, by the emphasis on the process factors. The remainder of this
paper seeks to broaden our understanding of accountability beyond that point.
One nal remark on this matter: it is important to note, as we also say below, that each
of these metaphors and types point to distinct traits that can be discerned in actually-
existing administration. They do not exist in isolation. Each of the spaces we describe
is in fact one component of a single phenomenon: the everyday ground-level experience
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of accountability in administrative work. When we speak of conditions of multiple, di-
verse and often conicting expectations under which actions and decisions are made – of
accountability as a kind of second-personal ‘practical reason’ – we are interested in the
constant ux of normative reections, social relationships, practical bargains, expedient
compromises, and myriad other manoeuvres that people construct in order to get through
their day with their personal integrity and their social milieu more or less intact.xvi So iso-
lating one element is rather like isolating a person’s heartbeat from the ow of their blood
for scrutiny, or a city’s trac from its streets. It is useful but we must always remember
that it is one part of a whole.
In the next section, where we discuss both the agora and the bazaar, we broaden the
relational account through a focus on that which underpins all ‘relationality’ (agora) and
through a focus on an alternative accountability space that might emerge (bazaar).
3 Two Accountability Spaces
3.1 Agora
Let us begin with a discussion of the ‘agora.’ We are concerned with the agora – in our
context – as a uid, contingent and localised accountability space, founded on an unending
cascade of social situations and the relationships that these situations inform. Following
Norton (2014), we take the situations and relationships that emerge within such spaces
as our ‘primordial unit of analysis.’ The agora, that is, is the fundamental social milieu
from which reasons, purposes and norms emerge, not because that is the agora’s aim, but
because, such a space is required if these things are to emerge.
Taking ground level administrative work – as with any other collaborative spheres – as
fundamentally and inherently social, we see human sociality and, following Smith ([1759]
2009), reciprocal sympathy as the foundation of practical reason. Such social spaces and
their relationships, that is to say, found our motives for action: they are inextricably linked
to the development of collaborative purposes. Motives for action are founded, we argue, on
the matrix of second-person standpoints within which we live our lives (following Darwall
2006). It is through these relationships that people develop and contribute towards collab-
orative projects, underpinned by collectively derived norms that focus on the fairness of
group aims, and the internal fairness of the procedures that the group employs.xvii
Our model, following Tyler and Blader (2003, 116, for instance), is that the general
‘toing-and-froing’ of people getting on (their ‘thick’ relations, so to speak), informs their
standpoints towards relatively ‘thin’ organisational procedures, managerial power and
the narratives of purpose that are handed down through organisational structures. The
metaphor of the agora, as such, constitutes the crux of our distinctive perspective on ac-
countability because, rather than holding ground-level actors to be relatively passive in
the construction of reasons for action, or individual motives, we hold these actors and
their relationships as primary in the construction of reasons for action.
To put this dierently, our existing in these spaces help us ‘bridge the gap’ between
“what can be immediately experienced about the other person and that person’s psycho-
logical states” (Schilbach et al. 2013, p. 394). These spaces, in bridging that gap, give us
a place from whence we can absorb the practices that help us get on. It is from there
that common purposes can emerge and develop in the context of people combining their
broader moral sentiments with the particular ethical requirements and constraints they
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experience in their everyday lives.xviii We see the development of collective purpose, in
other words, as being a function of more fundamental sets of thick social interaction.
Stepping on from this, our idea of the ‘agora’ denotes the everyday, ordinary, story of
collective purpose emerging from people’s being together. The special contribution of ad-
ministrative, corporate, state and other organisational bodies is that they seek to exploit
these social dynamics in order to harness the productive energies that emerge from so-
cial relations. Accountability, as we see it, describes the spaces produced through these
situations and relationships. This is signicant, at the very least, for more mechanistic
accountability studies because such studies tend to assume collective purpose as a given,
as something that is available to enforce (following Schillemans and Busuioc 2014). ‘Un-
accountable’ behaviour and the like is, in such approaches, taken simply as a matter of
compliance.
Our argument is, rst, that the kinds of hierarchical intent that underpin relationships
within the Bovens model, and that are at the heart of broader principal-agent mechanisms,
is only one force being brought to bear on collective purpose – and brought to bear very
often with unforseen consequences – and that so-called ‘unaccountability’ is likely to lie
in the realm of the broader accountabilities we describe here rather than in simply self-
serving conduct or in shirking. Where accountability studies places the forum at its core
of a system through which hierarchical will is disseminated and deviance is uncovered –
a system of control in other words – we see accountability as a far more pervasive matrix of
standpoints within which the individual negotiates their social existence, the group develops
purpose and that purpose is normalised. This is not simply a ‘black box’ that is irrelevant
to accountability studies, and nor is it a dynamic that accountability forums should aim to
overcome. Accountability in the broader sense, as the font of practical reason, both limits
or enables the forum’s reach, depending on the situation or on the manner in which the fo-
rum’s power and message cohere with other powers and messages as people’s standpoints
form and persist.
3.1.1 A Role for Moral Theory
Theories are not arguments, as David Schmidtz points out: they “are maps.” “Like maps,”
he writes “theories are not reality. They are at best serviceable representations. They
cannot be more than that (but they can be less; some maps are useless)” (Schmidtz 2007,
p. 433).xix Theories set out to dene a terrain – of justice, of ‘good work,’ or the like – and
in the case of moral theory are inextricably linked to everyday experience and the hard
questions we encounter every day.
In accountability’s case, such terrains have long been the subject of moral philosophy.
We are particularly interested in the moral sociology of Adam Smith ([1759] 2009; [1776]
1999) and, as we mention on the pages above, in the work of Stephen Darwall (2006; 2013).
Smith’s contribution comes through his focus on sympathy and on the social foundations
of and the interaction between normativity, recognition and esteem. Darwall, following
from Smith, focuses on the ‘second-personal’ character of norms and thus emphasises their
elementary, emergent and egalitarian bases.
So, while the metaphors scholars use as are useful in articulating and illuminating com-
plex concepts – in this instance the accountability’s relational character – we ought not
to over look their theoretical roots: that through metaphor we are setting out a terrain
through which moral theory can be read into and applied to the ground-level experiences
of everyday work.
The Smithian perspective on practical reason, which acted as a precursor to Kant’s more
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‘internal’ perspective (see Kant 2005; Fleischacker 1991), focuses on the social in the devel-
opment of reasons for action. Smith’s perspective is radically intersubjective. If we think
about it from the individual’s point of view, people develop reasons for action, appropriate
to the context they nd themselves in, based on irreducably social considerations. They
engage with questions of action in terms that sit in the same conceptual arena as Smith’s
‘impartial spectator’ - that is, they consider their own position by developing a sense of
how they might appear to others. This is not a simple egoistical calculation, but a combina-
tion of contextualised norms, concern for their fellows and concern for how their fellows
see them.xx Such an endeavour would not be possible, however, without the individual’s
entry into society and without the development and practice of everyday social relation-
ships between the individual and their peers. Moral self-examination is a skill and as such
it must be learned (see Annas 2011, for similar points).
As Darwall (2006) has it, this ‘team-building’ skill is rooted in conditions of mutual
recognition between people as they regard each other in various ways, as moral equals, as
particular subjects of esteem and as authorities on particular modes of action. Note that,
for Darwall’s development of Smith, the authority of others is not initially a function of
any formal oce they hold, but a recognition of them as moral equals acting in a particular
shared context, of which formal oces are one part. So, we argue, as Sennett (2007) would
have it, a formal oce holder who was not deemed deserving of their authority would have
little capacity for inuencing social action.
The forum’s traction, as we see it, is ltered through such perspectives. It is not sep-
arate from them. Its relational power comes not from its formal processes but from a
broader and partly emergent legitimation dynamic that all social oces must both under-
take and undergo (on legitimacy and legitimation in political oces, see Barker 2001). A
relational ‘grammar’ must emerge whereby the forum’s imperatives agree with broader
social expectations: otherwise actors might well baulk at the prospect of obeying the fo-
rum’s demands. Any descriptor of action as ‘accountable’ or ‘unaccountable’ is in eect
a call for particular ‘proper’ purposes over others and is, we think, invariably taken as a
given within accountability studies. In fact, as our perspective suggests, purposes emerge,
evolve and are negotiated within social spaces at ground level,xxi in (invariably incomplete
and contingent) answer to multiple, diverse and often conicting social expectations (see
Dubnick 2014b, for a discussion) with externally disseminated imperatives constituting
but one force on people’s active engagement with their conduct.
Of course, we do not discount the possibility of shirking or dishonesty in administrative
work. Nor do we dismiss the capacity of disciplinary mechanisms for limiting opportu-
nities for such conduct to take hold. Our point is more that those mechanisms necessar-
ily interact with people’s more ‘primordial’ accountability spaces, often in unpredictable
ways.
Consider, for instance, the problem of gaming in target systems, as described by Hood
(2006) and others (Bevan and Hood 2006, for instance), where attempts to deliver account-
ability with regard to performance led instead to almost the opposite of what was intended.
From our perspective, the disruption is very often linked not only to tension between hi-
erarchical aims and ground-level dynamics but also to the eects that reinforced imper-
atives, ‘externally’ imposed (relative to social dynamics), have on the internal politics of
organisations.
Given this, for instance, we hold the forum’s eectiveness – the forum as described by
Bovens etc – to be in large part a function of the agora rather than being an independent
force in its own right. Both the forum’s capacity to bring itself to bear on people’s conduct
and its the capacity to comprehend the roots of ‘unaccountable’ conduct are rooted not
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so much in hierarchical force and in the tools that the principal-agent model propose, but
in the ground-level social dynamics that we describe above. Whether these dynamics are
described as ‘culture’, or as ‘networks’ or the like, they come down to a relatively free-
owing, morally-egalitarian set of interactions, from which common purposes emerge.
The force that mechanisms bring to bear do not do so in a vacuum: they do so in a
context and the context determines the eect they will have. Bovens notes that individual
identities emerge “on the basis of existing ideas and in dialogue with others” (Bovens 1998,
p. 99) but he is less successful at extending this observation to the hierarchical power of
the forum itself. This matters because accountability (in its forum guise) tends to regard
itself both directly as monitor and indirectly as reason for action. It constitutes the trans-
parency that allows knowledge to be passed up the hierarchy and as such is, post-factum,
the vehicle for retribution and pre-factum, the edice that induces compliance (on pre-
and post-factum, see Dubnick and Frederickson 2011b). It is, in other words, necessarily
hierarchical and coercive.
The forum is weak if there is no ground-level ‘t’. In practice, the forum’s response to
this weakness is invariably a reinforced turn towards its principal-agent tools. When the
principal-agent mechanism comes to the fore, the focus turns to reinforced surveillance
and scrutiny, reinforced reward/penalty structures and reinforced narratives of admoni-
tion and approbation. Again, however, the success or not of these tools depends on the
broader patterns of accountability that have emerged within organisations.
3.2 Bazaar
Whereas the Bovens forum, as with all other accountability spaces, relies upon the agora
for its traction, other accountability spaces that pervade public administration tend to
be illegible to more formal or ritualised spaces, or are treated with great hostility. We
turn to the ‘bazaar’ here as one such space. Bazaar describes the exchange element in
the accountability space: the standpoints that emerge in situations where people develop
relationships – eeting at times – rooted in their trading with others in mutual pursuit of
each other’s interests.
This section is crucial for us because it sets out an alternative and emergent relational
space, independent of – and illegible to – the forum, through which both accountable rela-
tionships and seeming unaccountability emerge. We suggest that the dynamics inherent in
bazaar are fundamentally human, elemental and inevitable (following Smith [1776] 1999)
but also that they are fundamental to administrative work. That the Bovens model cannot
account for bazaar is striking, we think, because it suggests the model’s narrow nature: it
seeks accountability out in a space largely dened by the principal agent model but not by
the social underpinnings upon which its relational precepts rely.
The section is broken down into two parts. First, we discuss what precisely we think
is included in this kind of ‘thin/thick’ space. Second, we discuss some characteristics of
bazaar – its ubiquity and its contribution to productivity and from there discuss the atti-
tude of actually-existing forums towards the bazaar and what that tells us about the idea
of accountability itself. Our aim is as such twofold: to draw out the special characteristics
of this accountability space and to emphasise its centrality to actually existing adminis-
tration.
Note that we do not approach the forum as a moral problem primarily: as we have it
in the discussion below, exchange may well be used for good reasons and bad. One can
easily imagine the emergence of a kleptocratic system as people trade on their insider
power. What is hard to imagine, though, is a social system where people do not trade on
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their positions to some extent. It is not automatically the case that this must be deemed a
bad thing.
Our focus is on the emergent cascade of negotiations, exchanges and favours that come
to the fore both in corporate and administrative environments. These sometimes eeting
instances of exchange, emerging within the agora, assist people in developing reciprocal
standpoints, commiting to arrangements and giving accounts of themselves to their peers.
They also help them to develop practical reasons and to act on the social foundations that
they (collaboratively) construct. Such arrangements are ‘thin’ in their eeting nature, but
‘thick’ in the moments that they hold (drawing on the thick-thin distinction that is brought
to the fore in O’Kelly and Dubnick 2006).xxii
What we are interested in in this section, in other words, is the fundamental trait Smith
outlines in The Wealth of Nations:
In civilised society [a person] stands at all times in need of the co-operation
and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sucient to
gain the friendship of a few persons . . .But man has almost constant occasion
for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their
benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their
self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to
do for him what he requires of them. Whoever oers to another a bargain
of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want and you shall
have this which you want, is the meaning of every such oer; and it is in this
manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good
oces which we stand in need of (Smith [1776] 1999, pp. 118-9).xxiii
The will to exchange ‘by treaty, by barter and by purchase’ is a central social trait, what-
ever the currency of exchange. Trade in reputation, esteem, inuence, access, gifts or
power is as compelling as more traditional commerce and it provides an important basis
for cooperation in organisational settings.
It is also worth pointing out, following Smith, that we do not necessarily see this kind
of trade, to put it somewhat pointedly, as the ‘feral’ pursuit of some kind of solipsistic
advantage. Exchange as Smith sees it can be more related to prudence, a rational balancing
of interests with the facts and constraints of the exchange itself and a socialising inuence
on human ambition (see Hirschman 1997; also Mace 1967, esp ch. 4).
If this is the case, then exchange ought to be regarded as a far more nuanced phe-
nomenon than is generally the case. The relationships that emerge in the ‘bazaar’ tend
to be viewed as purely egoistical – borne purely from unreasonable, or non-reasoned self-
interest. The perception of informality around exchange, its association with individual
gain and the whi of corruption all lead exchanges invisibility in administrative ethics
literature except as a phenomenon that needs to be rooted out.
Contrary to this perspective, we look upon exchange as a crucial subject of study in
our eld – for two reasons: its ubiquity and its underpinning of organisational productiv-
ity. We discuss ubiquity and productivity briey below before moving on to discuss the
relationships between accountability within exchange and the accountability forum.
3.2.1 Ubiquity
In part, as Smith realised, exchange rooted in self-interest is a fundamental aspect of hu-
man society and requires a strong level of mutual respect for each other’s dignity on the
part of the persons involved (Darwall 2013, p. 39). Although exchange does not rely on
thick personal connections, people pursue their goals by shifting to the development of
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relatively narrow connections, based on reciprocal commitments to pursue agreed ends
with their interlocutors, and on normative commitments, “for example that the exchange
is made by free mutual consent, that neither will simply take what the other has and so
on” (Darwall 2006, pp. 46-47). Exchange, Darwall goes on to say,
. . . involves a reciprocal acknowledgement of norms that govern both parties
and presupposes that both parties are mutually accountable, having an equal
authority to complain, to resist coercion, and so on. (Darwall 2006, p. 48)
This kind of exchange, in other words, is a necessary element in the human condition and
it is surely beyond the capacities of any organisational infrastructure to eradicate it. Where
people work together towards various ends, they will exchange favours, information, or
esteem in pursuit of those ends.
Exchange involves the development and maintenance of skills that derive from familiar-
ity with the rules and norms of a range of social practices (involving an (implicit) absorp-
tion both of ‘games’ and of ‘meta-games’, following Tanney 2000). It is inherently social
and, for those who develop the skills, especially in ‘repeat games’, where the same players
repeat their interactions numerous times, benets follow.
3.2.2 Productivity
In fact, given that any work process must be necessary be incomplete, it may well be
that these kinds of relationship are necessary given the diculty both in fully anticipating
the requirements of any task and in rendering work fully legible to managerial control.
The travails of organisations where employees ‘work to rule’ are proof of the reliance of
organisations on self-directed action by their workforce. While it is not the only aspect of
this, we place bazaar into this category - self-directed collaborative action without which
administrative organisations would simply not function.
In part this is because the kinds of exchange we are interested in, often as part of repeat
games are crucial in the development (or not) of trustworthiness and in networks of trust.
So, while bazaar in and of itself sits between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ in terms of social relation-
ships (‘thick relations’ within ‘thin parameters’), repeated iterations of exchange may well
lead to some thickening of relationships as people establish their reliability and bona des
and as more stable accountability spaces emerge.
Bureaucratic Back-Scratching
One instance of this was outlined by Robert Goodin (1975) at level of bureaucratic agen-
cies: ‘bureaucratic back-scratching’ as he called it. Writing from a public choice perspec-
tive, Goodin challenged the idea that bureaucratic interaction could be explained simply
in terms of clashing self-interest. “The traditional emphasis on conict in the bureaucratic
politics model is appropriate only in certain circumstances,” Goodin wrote. “Where high
stakes are involved it is likely to work well, but on the other side of some fuzzy threshold
stakes are low and rational bureaucrats would cooperate rather than ght” (Goodin 1975,
p. 65).
For Goodin, the key dynamic in exchange of this type was towards coordination and
collaboration aimed at ensuring, not that all would compete, but that all would get some-
thing that they wanted. It was inherently cooperative – a point that can be made in more
general terms about markets (Lindblom 2002). And indeed, administrative systems can
be highly ecient in their development of dual trust-exchange dynamics between parties
(Williamson 1975).
Tolkach
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The Soviet system represents one – perhaps surprising – administrative arena where
exchange emerged in interesting ways. The intensely top-down system through which
the mid-20th Century Soviet Union was organised relied upon Gosplan’s instructions and
disciplinary capacities to drive production. The basic idea was that Gosplan would con-
coct a matrix of inputs and outputs required to arrive at an endpoint for production, that
this would be disseminated to plants, distribution points etc, and that managers would
implement the plan in accordance with their instructions.
In fact, the system was sustained, to the degree that it was, through a system of exchange
that existed well below the ocial line of sight. This system relied on ‘blat’ – the exchange
of favours, goods, and the like – and especially on the tolkach (see Berliner 1957).xxiv
Present in most Soviet enterprises, a tolkach acted “as an expeditor,” as Litwack puts it
(for Berliner (1957, p. 209), a ‘pusher’ or ‘jostler’),
whose primary responsibility is to establish long-run personal relationships
with other organizations for the purpose of procuring needed supplies, partic-
ularly in emergency circumstances. The presence of these informal relation-
ships is critical to the coordination mechanism of the economy itself” (Litwack
1991, p. 80).
The Soviet system, especially the vertical economic planning system centered around
Gosplan, the Soviet State’s economic planning commission, can be imagined as the ulti-
mate realisation of vertical integration, in its case integration across the state as a whole.
Importantly, though, it could only have persisted as long as it did because of the informal
institutionalisation of exchange at the ground level through the tolkach (on Gosplan etc
see Spuord 2011; Shalizi 2012).
Blat, of course, also extended into society as a whole. The delegitimation of explicitly
price-driven market institutions in Soviet economic life simply served to displace exchange
into informal – and invisible – arenas, with exchange reconstituted as part of the broader
workings of social life. The truck and barter of everyday life, so to speak, serves to ll
the vacuums created within managerial orders. As the hero of Monika Maron’s Flugasche,
an East German novel of the 1980s, was chastised: “‘You have so many friends,’ Aunt Ida
always said, ‘and in spite of that everything in your place always needs to be xed’” (Maron
[1981] 1986, p. 17). This is where we nd bazaar to be most interesting: it emerges as one
part of a broader social milieu: one set of expectations that sit in an unstable equilibrium
with other expectations in the accountability space. And it is inextricably linked to the
creation, management and maintenance of relationships between people.
So the lesson we can learn from the Soviet experience is this: no matter how much
exchange is discouraged, it can at best be displaced. It is not only a essential part of hu-
man interaction but is, as Goodin points out, irreducibly normative. It can of course be
highly exploitative, where people trade on their insider power – as gatekeepers, as service
providers etc – for their own benet, but it is not necessarily so. It can equally involve
people trading on their insider power, with other insiders, in order to get things done, to
construct relationships of trust and to deepen productive ties within or across organisa-
tions.
3.2.3 Hostility
The hostility with which bazaar is greeted in actually-existing accountability forums arises,
we think, from two concerns. First and foremost, is the concern about ‘trade as kleptoc-
racy’: that is, that people might trade their insider power in exchange for favours, goods,
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money and the like. This is, in other words, a concern about corruption, as commonly
dened. The second concern is a broader concern for the ‘illegibility’ of the kinds of ex-
change we discuss above: that such exchange is not open to description, or formal scrutiny
or the like. That makes it seem either trivial – because it is simply part of a ‘black box’
of everyday work – or sinister – because it cannot be brought within the remit of the
hierarchies that the forum seeks to enforce.
The problem of corruption is of course undeniable, but we see it very often as a distrac-
tion. Our point is that an understanding of accountability must entail an understanding of
the ground-level environment through which people construct their elds of action. Those
environments involve the construction, management and maintenance of both thick and
thin relationships between people and most importantly they are the substrate through
which the productive character of work emerges. Accountability, understood as a forum,
is rightly concerned with corruption, but the study of accountability must also be a study
of performance. Regarding which the forum is simply not the only place to look.
For the same reason, the suggestion of triviality – that bazaar is not a relevant subject for
accountability studies – is misplaced. In constructing the accountability space, that is in
developing practical reason in the face of multiple, diverse and often conicting expecta-
tions, the forum is but one motivating factor among many. That is because people function
in a network of expectations and pressures to act and seek to form a path through their
working day in accordance with the imperatives the derive from that network (including
through broader concerns about purpose as derived through the ‘agora’). ‘Third-personal’
hierarchies and their forums are certainly important, but they are only one element in
the pattern of expectations. And apparently‘unaccountable’ conduct from one – say third-
personal – perspective might well be accountable conduct from, say a second-personal
perspective. What’s more, what we privilege in the third personal perspective might well
function best as a series of second-personal perspectives as managerial force is translated
into persuasion, collaboration and, as we see below, the collaborative development of the
corporate purpose.
4 Concluding Remarks
Drawing on Dubnick’s Situating Accountability (2007), Bovens discusses the phenomenon
of “political ocials and public organisations sometimes [free-riding] on [the] evocative
powers of accountability” (2010, p. 949). His point is that political actors recruit the term
“as a rhetorical tool to convey an image of good governance and to rally supporters”
(Bovens 2010, p. 950). We too nd this to be striking and important, although we suggest
that the line from this view of accountability as ‘desirable’ to the idea of it as ‘normative’
is complicated by the problems of power, ‘subservience’ and discretion that Bovens goes
on to discuss.
It is important to emphasise the political content of public institutions when we dis-
cuss the idea of governmental questions as being normative. The ‘normative,’ in such
environments, cannot simply be regarded either as exogenous to the institutions, or as an
separated from the kinds of political struggle that we associate with the political realm.
The normative, in other words, cannot simply be taken as a given, introduced from out-
side our sphere of interest. It is, rather, a territorial claim, designating the speaker, or their
favourites, as authorities who possess the right to dene and enforce specic organisa-
tional purposes.
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In this context, the virtue statements contained in many accountability discourses are
better described as polemical rather than solely as normative. This means that we ought to
push one step beyond the ‘ought statements’ that make up much accountability talk and
take note of accountability’s utility in attempts to solidify and x organisational purposes
towards specic ends. Ocial accountability discourses – the accountability forum, in
other words – are at base rooted in questions of power (on which, see O’Kelly and Dubnick
2013).
Our core point is this: assertions about ‘unaccountability’ very often reect a failure
to appreciate the fundamentally relational nature of accountability: those who use such
assertions as bases for action aimed at making situations, processes or people ‘more ac-
countable’ in fact seek to assert or impose a certain form of relationship – one that is
hierarchical and monopolistic – and reect therefore a drive to power and domination.
That this is rationalised as the quest to improve performance, democracy, ethics ought
not obscure its basic intent. The accountability forum, driven by polemical claims, seeks
to impose order and authority on the social milieu within public organisations (and else-
where) but it constitutes only one form of accountability. It constitutes only one cascade
of expectations amongst an often conicting and diverse multiplicity.
The Bovens Model, with its emphasis on process, seems to regard it as describing and
enforcing a preeminent expectation that ought to override the others. Which is a way of
saying that they tend to either assume (or accept) the legitimacy of the forum’s claims. This
is unfortunate because it allows the forum to tack towards an emphasis on its principal-
agent components. A greater emphasis on the relational would take the forum’s claims
and authority as negotiated and as a contingent by-product of many other commitments
that people have made and (emergent) expectations under which they work.
It is insucient for any study of accountability, however, to simply describe unaccount-
ability as an absence of accountablity and leave it at that. Such an apparent absence, from
the forum’s point of view, most often describes a situation shaped by two factors, whether
for good or ill:
1. The forum’s making a claim that runs, on balance, against the other expectations
through which people have shaped their working lives.
and thus
2. The forum’s disciplinary mechanisms either failing to overwhelm those expecta-
tions or reconguring the paths people negotiate through their expectations in un-
intended ways.xxv
So unaccountability is not a failure of people to ‘be accountable,’ or at least that is not
a useful description of their conduct. Unaccountability is, rather a failure of power, and
often a failure of force.
We say this without committing ourselves to the rightness or otherwise of any path
of conduct within organisations, although we are disposed to approaching accountability
failures sympathetically in the rst instance. Rather than assuming the decision-making
autonomy of a homo oeconomicus, we treat people as irreducibly social in their motiva-
tions and in their developing reasons for action. We see organisational ends as in fact
negotiated at the ground-level, not simply as given. Those who hold the formal power to
shape ends, their purported agents and myriad gatekeepers and middlemen all negotiate
collection action on endless bases having ‘come together as a [in this case relatively lo-
cal] public’ (Habermas 1989, p. 27) in – as we call it – an ‘agora’. They do not do this as
a matter of policy or by organisational imperative. They do this because the agora is a
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fundamental aspect of both governance and the human condition. Administration, from
this perspective, is just that: human before anything else.
Notes
iCF Strydom 1999, who saw ‘responsibility’ as the emerging ‘master frame’ that would shape
social and political thinking in the 21st century.
iiTwo often cited expositions of the historical development of responsibility as a concept are
McKeon 1957 and Ricœur [1995] 2000. Both rely on a historical distinction between ‘imputation’ and
‘accountability’; see Kelty 2008 for an overview of these works. Much of the scholarship on responsi-
bility has followed that approach. For example, Goodin 1987 drew a distinction between ‘blame’ and
‘task’ responsibilities and assigned accountability to the latter. In Bovens 1998, accountability is pre-
sented as a distinctive (‘passive’) form of responsibility and contrasted with ‘active’ (virtue-related)
responsibility. In his explication of environmental governance, Pellizzoni (2004) posits accountabil-
ity as one among four types of responsibility (the others are care, liability, and responsiveness). More
recently, Vincent 2010 provides a six-fold elaboration of responsibilities (based on the work of H.L.A.
Hart) that avoids any reference to accountability while clearly implying its relevance to several of
the ‘syndromes’ she highlights.
iiiSee Bambrough 1960, for an overview of Wittgenstein’s view of family resemblances.
ivCompare with overview in Bovens, Schillemans, and Goodin 2014.
vSee the work of Judith Butler (2005), R. Jay Wallace (1994).
viBovens cites H.L.A. Hart’s elaboration of various forms of responsibility in this regard, noting
that he is using the term ‘accountability’ in lieu of ‘liability-responsibility’ which he prefers ‘since it
has fewer strictly legal connotations and also entails an element of moral or political responsibility’
(Bovens 1998, 24, n.3).
viiInterestingly, the initial reference to the forum concept does not cite Bovens’ 1998 work, but
rather Christopher Pollitt’s use of the concept in his 2003 The Essential Public Manager. Pollitt,
however, is using the concept quite dierent – that is, to describe the deliberative arena in which
public managers are operating. See Pollitt 2003, pp. 84-85.
viiiSee also Schillemans and Bovens 2011; Bovens 2010; Bovens, Schillemans, and ‘T Hart 2008;
Bovens 2007.
ixKaplan 1964, pp. 259-262 elaborates six dierent ‘cognitive styles’ through which models are
applied (literary, academic, eristic (propositional), symbolic, postulational and formal), and treats
metaphors separately as a problematic (p. 265-266). During the 1970s and 1980s, however, a ‘metaphor-
ical turn’ occurred among methodologists and those who study the history, sociology and philosophy
of science (see Marshak 2003), and there is little doubt that Kaplan would have included ‘metaphor-
ical style’ in an updated list.
xFor example, see Leary 1990.
xiIn fact, we suggest four possible relationships elsewhere (see O’Kelly and Dubnick 2014) though
we expand on only two in this paper. The two relationships that are missing from this paper are
the ‘cathedral’, a space bound by hierarchies, rituals and rules, and the ‘monastery’, a stable space
dened by ‘thick’ relationships founded on shared norms.
xiiWe employ these terms, as we say above, in order to assist some complex concepts and ideas
to come to life. The rst thing to note, given this, is the overlap between the Greek ‘agora’ and
the Latin ‘forum’: both in reality denoted the same or similar public spaces, where people gathered
for trade (drawing in parallels with the Persian (through Italian) ‘bazaar’). We draw the following
distinctions (in brief): forum as juridical and historigraphical, ritualistically aimed at reconstructing
reasons and states of mind behind actions and then at producing some form of action in response to
the perspectives that emerge; agora as the foundational space within which – eeting and contingent
perhaps – publics emerge through fundamental social interactions; and bazaar as a space through
which people use exchange in order both to pursue objectives and to ‘thicken’ their social ties.
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xiiiThe forum, as we see it, through its procedures and rituals, seeks at its best to construct a kind
of ‘historical knowledge’, as Collingwood would call it, that requires a ‘re-enactment’ of some event
(see Collingwood 1946, 282). For an historian, this requires that “past thought [be] rethought by
means of the critical scrutiny of contemporary evidence” (Browning 2004, p. 74) in order to bring
past thought into the present (see Collingwood [1939] 1944, 73; and Collingwood 1946, 302 in
particular). In the forum’s case, the production of knowledege requires the soliciting of evidence
from events, documents and, most signicantly, from the accountee him or herself.
xivSympathetic in Adam Smith’s ([1759] 2009, 21) sense, as in a route into an understanding of
the other’s ‘sentiments’.
xvAlthough an archaic form of contract that lacks the relational elements identied in socio-legal
scholarship (see MacNeil 2001; Fried 1982; Fried 2012).
xviWhen we speak of practical reason we mean the construction of reasons for action: resolving
the question of ‘what one ought to do’. See Darwall 2006; Wallace 2014
xviiOn which, see Tom R. Tyler and Steven L. Blader 2000; Steven L Blader and Tom R Tyler 2003;
also Tom R. Tyler 2010; Olkkonen and Lipponen 2006; Lind and Bos 2002; Tom R. Tyler and Steven L.
Blader 2003.
xviiiThis echoes Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit, described by Pinkard as “the system of practices
and institutions that surround the moral life.” Sittlichkeit, in other words “furnishes agents with a
conception of what is good and best for them, and it trains them into a kind of ‘ethical virtuosity’
in discerning what is required for the type of person they are in the type of situation in which they
nd themselves” (Pinkard 1999, pp. 226, 226). In some ways, also, our outlook echoes that of Julia
Annas’s discussion (2011, see also Rorty and Wong 1993 and other essays in the same volume), from
a virtue ethics perspective, of virtues as learned – as skills – and as being in many ways subject to
intelligent engagement (as opposed to being simply handed down from authority).
xixSchmitz goes to say that
No map represents the only reasonable way of seeing the terrain. We would be as-
tounded if two cartography students independently assigned to map the same terrain
came up with identical maps. It would not happen. Likewise, theorists working inde-
pendently inevitably construct dierent theories. The terrain underdetermines choices
they make about how to map it. Not noticing this, they infer from other theorists
choosing dierently that one of them is mistaken and that dierences must be resolved
(Schmidtz 2007, p. 433).
xxAs Smith has it,
When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence
upon it, either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide
myself, as it were into two persons; and that I , the examiner and judge, represent a
dierent character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and
judged of. The rst is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct
I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it
would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. The second is the
agent, the person who I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character
of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion” (Smith [1759] 2009, 135f).
See also Raphael 2007, esp ch. 5, for an account of how the idea of the impartial spectator evolved
across the various editions of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.
xxiSee for instance Suchman and Edelman 1996, on such dynamics within law-making.
xxiiLet us begin by noting that we do not associate the core characteristics of the ‘bazaar’ account-
ability space with the dynamics that are associated with New Public Management (NPM) and subse-
quent movements. New Public Management’s call to utilise the price mechanism, market forces and
innovation to allow the state to steer public services rather than provide them itself (Osborne and
Gaebler 1992). It is no coincidence that this major driver in discussions of public administration has
been positively correlated with the rise of accountability as government’s core focus. NPM and its
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heirs are, after all, articulated precisely as being a solution to accountability failures in bureaucracy
and as the route to weeding out non-performance through accountability.
What does this form of accountability actually mean however? Accountability here is a form
of exposure. NPM’s point, in a sense, was to create new, seemingly more constructive problems and
vulnerabilities for bureaucrats to focus on – competition, tendering and the like – in such a way that
something called accountability would emerge (see for instance Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector 1990, on
‘change management’ and the requirement to concoct new pressures to force organisational reform).
This accountability would come either from the disciplinary eects of failure’s transparency, or from
the more explicit standards set by ‘contractual’ governance – it relies, in short, on the production of
narrow principal-agent mechanisms. NPM is a project aimed at developing evidence through which
non-performance might be exposed and, derived from that, it is generally supposed, (Although the
link between this style of ‘accountability’ and administrative performance is tenuous at best. On
which see Dubnick 2005) through which performance might be improved.
The actually-existing switch to a more business-like public administration, however, emerged
not as marketised bureaucracy, but as a market for bureaucracies. The major thrust of the era has
been the rise of ‘giant rms’ (as Colin Crouch 2011, has called them) that compete for relatively long-
term contracts in the provision of public services, be they in education, healthcare, administration
of security or employment benets etc. As with the state, each of these rms is in many ways
characterised by complex lines of vertical and horizontal integration, and is subject to processes of a
Weberian ‘militarised’ discipline (Weber 1978, 1155) that seek to dene and control the landscapes
of work.
xxiiiThis paragraph continues, famously, with Smith telling us that “It is not from the benevolence
of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
interest.”
xxivSee also Berliner 1952; Berliner 1957; Padgett and Powell 2012; Holden 2011; Khestanov 2014
xxvIt is also possible that some apparent accountability failures might best be explained as a forum-
style mechanism (the bonus system in large nancial institutions perhaps) creating, reinforcing and
even intensifying a social milieu that runs against outsiders’ interests.
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